

When we talk about the security implications of International Communism we usually refer to a variety of security threats which affect the Free World. These have been fairly consistent in nature over the past 40 years and stem fundamentally from the fact that the Soviet regime (and after World War II the Red Chinese and the Eastern European satellites) have oriented their overt and covert government and party apparatus toward the gradual weakening and eventual destruction of non-Communist governments. The various Communist Parties and front organizations outside of the Soviet Orbit have been geared into this process. They have been reared and supported by the Soviet Bloc, and have continuously rendered support to the Center, including support for the Soviet and Satellite espionage effort.

The consistency of the security threat can best be illustrated by a few figures showing the number of Soviets employed in official Soviet installations abroad who were publicly exposed as espionage agents during the years 1942 to mid-1957.

Canada	15 cases
United States	24 cases
Japan	10 cases
Australia	14 cases
Sweden	10 cases
Norway	7 cases
Turkey	5 cases,

and so forth.

There are, of course, the additional cases which for one reason or the other can not be brought before the public eye.

*many cases may yet be undiscovered*  
Obviously, there are periods when the security threat posed by

International Communism decreases or increases sharply. Such increase or decrease is generally bound up with the political fortunes of the Soviet Bloc and the Communist movement. The Communists call their ups and downs the "ebb and flow" of the movement, and so there always has been an "ebb and flow" in the security threat. The point, however, is that a recession in the fortunes of the Communist movement does not always mean a slack period in subversive activities.

An illustration. When Stalin felt that our Marshal Plan was a political threat of the first order, he instructed a Western European Communist Party to organize para-military units in order to shake down their government. It so happened that, fortunately, the local Communists were not capable of meeting the order. Yet, the principle underlying this incident is clear, i. e., the "ebb" of the political development may produce a "flow" of subversive action. *But even* ~~Conversely~~ *when*

Communist political fortunes are high the security threat *is likely to* ~~increase~~ *increase.*

This truism holds particularly for periods when Communist tactics call for United Fronts and National Liberation movements.

We have experienced in our own country the security implications of this tactic when, exploiting the depression and social fermentation, the Communist Party was able to draw into its orbit a great number of sympathizers or secret members and launched systematically the penetration of our federal government offices in order to affect the nerve center of our society. Perhaps it is our own rather bitter experience which causes us to view with concern the current tactics of International Communism. Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence line and the blueprint of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party are, in our opinion, attempts to revive, on a global scale, the political climate of the Thirties which offered Communist Parties and the Soviet espionage services untold opportunities.

Obviously, the situation of the International Communist movement today is not the same as it was in the Twenties and Thirties. Communism has developed new capabilities and elements of strength. However, in the process of acquiring the territories of Eastern Europe and the land mass of China, ~~the~~ new and unprecedented weaknesses and internal conflicts have come to the surface. The death of Stalin and the ensuing struggle for power in the Soviet Union have set in

motion a historical process whose further course can not be easily predicted. By way of oversimplification it could be said somewhat paradoxically that, for the first time in history, Communism as an ideology, ruling system and international conspiracy is not only a continuing security threat to the Free World. In recent years it has generated its own internal security problems--the serpent is biting its own tail.

It may be worthwhile to dwell on this theme for a moment or two. The entire Communist movement, from Panama to Peking, from South Africa to Moscow, is interdependent. Developments in the Soviet Union have a direct bearing on the capabilities of the smallest Communist Party. Even a massive Communist regime such as the Chinese clearly recognizes the hard facts of interdependence. Mao's approval of the Soviet intervention in Hungary, whatever ideological reservations he may have had, was based on the recognition that the entire Communist world needs a strong Soviet Union with its position in Eastern Europe unchallenged and unchallengeable. And we have it on good authority that other Communist leaders think likewise.

What, then, do we mean when we refer to the internal security problems engendered by post-Stalin Communism?

First this. As you know from your own experience, the external threat of Communism starts with ideas--Communist ideology--

Communist propaganda. However artificial and objectively false, the Communist ideas form a large part of the motivation which propels individual Communists into all sorts of action--revolutions, strikes, espionage, sabotage, etc. You also know that Communist ideas are most difficult security problems. Literally, ideas can not be arrested. They cannot be fully eradicated.

Now, it seems that the Soviet leaders have been getting a dose of their own medicine. And not only the Soviet leaders, but also the leaders in Eastern Europe, China and of some Communist Parties outside of the Bloc. They are confronted with ideas which they consider downright subversive since they, to varying degrees, challenge the existing order. The Communist leaders try, of course, to stigmatize these ideas as Western imperialist imports or as the work of secret agents, which they are not. They have been produced by the nature of the system, and particularly by its political and economic failures.

The rise of Tito and Titoism which stimulated intellectual fermentation in Eastern Europe was indirect response to Soviet imperialism. The uprisings in Poland in June 1956 and the revolution in Hungary resulted from the intolerable economic and cultural conditions. Gomulka and Kadar are still coping with the root problem. The

fermentation in China stems from the reckless pace of communization. And the confusion and discontent in Western European and Latin and North American Communist Parties was caused largely by the exposure of Khrushchev's no longer secret speech of February 1956. There are current indications that Khrushchev's June 1957 purge of his competitors has further contributed to the malaise prevailing in some Communist Parties. In the Soviet Union itself unorthodox ideas have also cropped up under the impact of 1956 events in Eastern Europe. The Soviet student and the Soviet intellectual is groping for a new outlook, and will probably continue to do so. There are no indications that the Soviet public has been favorably impressed by the recent purge which it rightly considers as an internal power struggle without meaning for the average citizen.

These observations should not be construed as an estimate on the stability of the Sino/Soviet bloc regimes. They were meant to emphasize the thesis that in the post-Stalin period these regimes experienced internal security problems of their own making and it is fairly clear that they were recognized and treated as such.

There are essentially two ways open to any totalitarian regime when it comes to the problem of dealing with popular dissatisfaction.

There is the method of bloody suppression, and there is the method of the safety valve --or a combination of both. These methods have been used by the Czars, by the leaders of the Austro-Hungarian empire, by the ancient Romans. And it appears that the Communist Bloc leaders are employing them in the best tradition, according to time and circumstance. Time and circumstance being variables, however, the over-all pattern is complex.

At one end of the spectrum stands the Pole Gomulka. Gomulka is the most consistent exponent of the safety valve method. His program of retrenchment and concessions --widely misunderstood as genuine "national Communism" --saved Poland in the long run for the Soviets. AT the other end of the spectrum stands Khrushchev and the Soviet military during the period of the Hungarian revolution. In the center we find Mao and the Chinese leadership. Concerned with the after effects of the Hungarian revolution they have come to grips with the problem of socialist construction, i. e., with the problem of having to make good on their promises. Mao's "Bloom and Contend" slogan, his current Party rectification campaign, his thesis on contradictions in a Socialist society represent in essence nothing more than the safety valve concept. Controlling the means of coercion --the dictatorship of

the proletariat--~~X~~ Mao permits some steam to blow off. The purpose of the exercise is obviously to protect the regime and not the opposition.

Viewed in this perspective the problem of evolution in the Sino-Soviet orbit takes on a specific connotation. Will the regimes, now variously facing a resurgence of unorthodox and restless thinking, be able to contain and absorb it? The Communist leaders probably feel confident after having weathered the storms of 1956. Nevertheless, we can observe them building bigger and better safety valves. Khrushchev's milk, butter and meat program, his grandiose decentralization scheme falls in this category. But the final answers to the crucial question depends to a large extent on the further development of the power struggle in the Soviet Union.

[Fill in shortly before speech is made since impossible to anticipate what may happen between now and September].

Turning outward again, to the subject of the security threat posed by International Communism in 1957, the central fact here is the peaceful coexistence tactic developed by the Chinese Communists and by Khrushchev as a means for influencing and subverting people and governments, remains in full force. Khrushchev arranged publicity



for the June purge clearly in such a way that he and the Soviet regime would emerge as respectable; peaceful "democrats" who had been victimized and almost overthrown by the cunning Stalinists. In actual fact his competitors were hopelessly isolated and merely staged a last minute counter move which was doomed to failure. Nevertheless Khrushchev's maneuver served to inject new blood into his grand design of peaceful coexistence which had faltered somewhat in the wake of the Hungarian events. We are therefore inclined to believe Mr. Khrushchev when he emphasizes that the West should not expect any changes in Soviet foreign policy.

We also do not expect that the Khrushchev regime will cease to use foreign Communist Parties as instruments of Soviet foreign policy. In spite of all the protestations concerning the independence of Communist Parties from Moscow, Moscow has actually increased its training program for foreign Communists. Good indications exist that Moscow subsidies continue to flow through Soviet installations abroad. More recently, unprecedented communications between Moscow and foreign Communist Parties were established. Similar developments were observed in the relationship of CP China with foreign Communist Parties. It stands to reason that a pragmatist like Khrushchev would not relinquish valuable assets abroad. CP Indonesia is growing ominously in strength and influence. CP India gained control of the

state of Kerala. The Syrian Communist Party has maneuvered itself into a key position in the government. The Sino/Soviet coexistence tactic certainly proves to be a considerable protective cover under which the Communist movement may grow, especially in the underdeveloped areas of the Far and Middle East upon which Sino/Soviet attention is focused.

On balance and upon full consideration of events in the Sino/Soviet Bloc, the external security threat posed by International Communism in 1957 remains unchanged. So does our vigilance.